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Abstract 
This paper describes the manner in which the rural financial market and the private farm sector operate and 
interact. The state of the financial market, current lending conditions, and obstacles to credit flows on the 
supply and demand sides of the market are reviewed. We argue that there exists a preponderance of 
evidence which supports the notion that the limited number of observed credit transactions in the formal 
sector may be explained by restrictive factors on the demand side of the market. Thus, we challenge the 
conventional wisdom that Romanian farmers are credit rationed by lenders, and suggest that the limited 
frequency of credit transactions may be the result of economically rational decision making on the part of 
the farm households. 
Introduction 
The development of the rural financial market in Romania is attracting increasing 
interest from international donors, lending institutions, and researchers in the field of 
agricultural finance. A consensus has been reached amongst policy-makers, based on both 
empirical and anecdotal evidence, regarding the limited financial transactions found in 
the private farm sector. The principal source of this limited access is still a contentious 
issue, however. Much of the current literature on the subject focuses on supply 
constraints and distortions which act as both price and non-price barriers to financial 
market entry (See Schrieder, 1997; Davis and Gaburici, 1998; Davis and Hare, 1997). 
Little research has focused on the underlying market characteristics at the farm level. 
There exists a preponderance of evidence which supports the notion that the 
limited number of credit transactions in the formal sector may be explained by restrictive 
factors on the demand side of the market. In this paper we challenge the conventional 
wisdom that Romanian farmers are credit rationed by lenders, and suggest that low 
numbers of observed credit transactions may be the result of economically rational 
decision making on the part of farm households. Surprisingly, this phenomenon seems 
largely to have been ignored in the literature. 1 
This paper describes the manner in which the rural financial market and the 
private farm sector operate and interact. The data used to describe the farm side of the 
analysis come principally from household survey data collected in March and November 
of 1997 as part of the EU-Phare project on the Small Private Farm Sector in Romania and 
in February through May of 1998 as part of study funded by Agriculture and Food 
Consultants International (AFC) for the same purpose. 
The two data sets are representative of the regional variations which characterize 
Romanian agriculture. The EU data principally focuses on the plains regions around 
Timis and Dolj, while the AFC data were collected exclusively from the mountain area.2 
These distinct regional characteristics are of importance. Differences in the historical and 
current land tenure arrangements, topographical and climatic features, and production 
1 One exception is Davis' paper, "Access Constraints, Debt or Profitability: Are these Mutually Exclusive 
Elements of Romanian Rural Finance?" Forthcoming CERT discussion paper, 1998. 
2 A more complete description of the regions surveyed, as well as the sampling procedure used, is provided 
in the appendix of this paper. 
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output and structure, may necessitate a unique regional approach to addressing the 
problems which plague the agricultural sector in Romania. 
The paper is organized in the following manner: In Section I an overview of the 
development of the financial sector in Romania is provided. The lending environment is 
described, along with the status of key players allocating agricultural credit. Section II 
analyzes credit flows to the private farm sector. The most significant obstacles to credit 
transactions are identified, as reported by farm households. Collateral issues are 
addressed with respect to frictions on both the demand and supply side of the market. 
Branch banks and non-bank lending institutions (NBLl's) are described, along with their 
corresponding terms and conditions for financial services. Distinctions are drawn with 
respect to the appropriateness of these institutions in providing credit to the private 
agricultural sector. 
In Section Ill, the production/demand side of the market is closely scrutinized. 
Issues regarding farm structure, income-generating activities, and investment 
opportunities are addressed. The characteristics of the private agricultural sector, such as 
small farm size, fragmented structure, and low, diverse incomes are highlighted. 
Commensurate with the fragmented farm structure and subsistence production techniques 
employed by many private farmers, is a lack of credit demand. This section postulates 
that low farm and off-farm incomes, coupled with limited investment opportunities, make 
the assumption of debt highly unattractive for the small farmer. 
Section I: Financial Sector Overview 
The successful reform of financial systems in formerly centrally planned 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe is of fundamental importance to the economic 
transition of these regions3• Moreover, the integration of these countries into the world 
economy makes the efficient functioning of a domestic financial system all the more 
crucial (Caprio, 1995; EBRD, 1996; Davis and Hare, 1997; Heidhues, 1995). The status 
of financial sector policy and reforms in Romania is difficult to describe or predict, 
however, due to the dynamism and fluidity in this sector, coupled with the reluctance of 
most bank officials to provide any meaningful financial data. 
The situation is further complicated by a recent re-evaluation of traditional 
thinking regarding the role of the banking sector under central planning, as well as 
renewed concern over the direction of agricultural lending policy.4 Given the key role this 
sector must play for any meaningful development of the agricultural sector to occur, it is 
essential to evaluate past and present reforms. 
Romania's recent macro-economic performance has been far lower than 
anticipated, with a 6.6 percent decline in real GDP in 1997. A sharp fall in output has 
3 In a cross-country comparison of the status of reforms in CEE and CIS countries, Romania has a median 
ranking. In the category of rural fmance, it is considerably lower than other CEE countries (Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Poland), but is considered more advanced than Bulgaria and most other CIS countries 
(Csaki and Nash, 1997). 
4 Recent changes in policy towards Romania are telling. The World Bank has halted the provision of funds 
to the fmancial sector until fmancial reforms are carried out. External money is now directed for fmancial 
reforms, strengthening the prudential environment, and instituting new leasing laws. 
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been caused by the restrictive monetary , fiscal, and income policies (ACE-Phare, 1998). 
The consumer price index for 1997 was 154 percent over the same period from 1996, 
leading to a significant decline in real purchasing power (EC, 1998). Significant drops in 
construction activity (22 percent) and fixed capital formation (16 percent) were also 
observed. Unemployment continues to be a problem, officially listed at 9.9 percent. 
Underemployment is likely to be far higher, however. 
Monetary policy has continued to be quite volatile. Although at the beginning of 
1997, the National Bank of Romania (NBR) initially halted the provision of mandated 
subsidized loans to the agricultural and state-owned sectors, the policy was subsequently 
relaxed, leading to an increase in the inflation rate. Policy was then restricted in October 
of 1997, leading to a sharp increase in nominal and real interest rates. If current 
monetary policies are continued, there may be further reductions in output and a 
continued decline in investment, affecting the financial viability of many firms and banks 
(ACE-Phare, 1998). 
The acute problems which plague Romania's financial sector can be traced back 
to the institutional role of the financial sector under central planning. Unlike traditional 
market economies, where the financial system performs the role of screening, monitoring, 
and managing the payments system, the banking system under central planning generally 
acted as a vehicle for government mandates. 5 Credit and investment decisions were 
traditionally made without regard for allocative or technical efficiency, nor the 
opportunity cost for funds. State-Owned Enterprises (SOE's) had no incentive to repay 
loans because future credit was independent of past repayment and mechanisms to 
enforce credit contracts were non-existent (Davis, 1997). Unfortunately, this close-knit 
relationship between the government and financial system has been institutionalized into 
the current system. The effects of continued government mandated lending schemes 
continue to cause severe market distortions and exacerbate macro-economic instability. 
Since the collapse of the Romanian central planning system in 1989, the 
government has persisted in using various sources of funds and credit delivery 
mechanisms to reach the final borrower with low cost funds. A number of sources were 
used to finance agriculture: the state budget, the NBR, and State Ownership Funds. 
There has been no stable rule for financing, and as a result a variety of financing tools 
have been used (Tesliuc, 1996). The allocated funds have traditionally been non-
transparent, and often have been offered at negative real rates of interest. Due to the non-
transparency of these funds, the costs associated with this allocation are difficult to 
quantify, but can generally be stated as being financed by tax payers in the following 
ways: 
(1) directly through the budget, 
(2) indirectly, through reduced profits of the NBR which also represent lost revenues for 
the budget, 
(3) through reduced margins in the commercial banks; in part through "crowding out" of 
lending to other sectors, 
5 For our purposes, government mandated lending is defined to be the administrative delivery of credit for 
agriculture in which, instead of bank officials, politicians, bureaucrats and parliamentarians decide how 
much, when, and at what terms credit must be given, and for what purposes (Tesliuc, 1996). 
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(4) through the inflation rate, which has represented a tax on holders of money, 
( 5) as a transfer from the general population to the agricultural sector. 
Various mechanisms exist for the distribution of "cheap" credit to the agricultural 
sector in Romania. The most common manner in which this is done is through the 
NBR's preferential lending programs. Budgetary provisions are routed to the state-
owned banks through a window at the NBR. The principal administrator of these 
programs is Banca Agricola (BA), the agricultural state bank. 
Subsidies are provided to the targeted borrower either directly, through 
preferential interest rates, or indirectly, through un-enforced contracts. The recipients of 
these transfers continue to be the unreformed sector of the economy, in spite of SOE's 
proclivity to be recidivist defaulters. The status of BA's loan portfolio is generally 
considered to be precarious, in large part due to non-performing loans of the unreformed 
sectors of the economy. Restructuring of Banca Agricola is in process; its bad loan 
portfolio, estimated at 3500 Bln Lei, is being reincorporated in the public debt (Csaki and 
Nash, 1997). 
The proportion of government spending which has been devoted to these transfers 
has been increasing, representing 1.5 percent of total spending from 1993-95, up to 4.6 
percent in 1996. The rationale has generally been that without government intervention, 
credit would not have been supplied to the sector, leading to potentially damaging 
consequences for food production and security. Additionally, it is perceived that this 
sector suffers from serious cost disadvantages and should be subsidized (Tesliuc, 1996). 
These subsidy arrangements, however, result in a disarticulation between 
production and lending (Vogel and Adams, 1996). Private farmers that operate 80 
percent of arable land and contribute 80 percent of agricultural production are receiving 
less than 20 percent of these transfers (Tesliuc, 1996). The crowding-out effect of these 
lending programs is difficult to measure, but it is unreasonable to expect that other 
elements of the banking system will enter the rural credit markets as long as BA 
continues to provide highly subsidized loans. 
Banca Agricola dominates the discussion about the Romanian financial sector 
because of its key role in the provision of targeted, subsidized credit, as well as its large 
proportion of non-recoverable debt, large amounts of mobilized savings, and the sizable 
fiscal drain on the national economy. The number of alternative financial institutions 
operating in Romania, however, is quite high. There are currently 40 banks operating in 
the country, but the sector is still dominated by the state-owned financial institutions such 
as the Romanian Commercial Bank, the Romanian Development Bank (BRD), 
BANCOREX, Eximbank, the Postal Bank, and the Savings Bank (CEC). Like BA, 
however, many of these state-owned banks directly devolved from the NBR to act as 
fiscal transfer agencies for government funding in commerce, construction, export 
activities, and savings. These banks, together with BA, hold more than 70 percent of 
total banking assets (Peoples et al., 1997). 
Recent lending practices throughout the financial sector have been generally 
broadened. Banca Agricola, for example, has attempted to reduce its high concentration 
of loans to the agricultural sector. The goal is a net reduction in the proportion of 
agricultural loans, from 75 percent of its total loan portfolio to less than 25 percent. The 
manner in which the bank will accomplish this goal is still unclear, but anecdotal 
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information suggests that there is a strong link between BA's aggressive savings 
mobilization policies and investments in high-return government bills. 
Commensurate with BA' s reduction in agricultural lending, is an increase in the 
participation of other state banks. These banks have been encouraged to do so by a 
sizable appropriation from the government of Romania (GOR) for the purpose of funding 
purchases of agricultural inputs. Many of the banks now have agricultural loans which 
represent 2-12 percent of their loan portfolios. It is unclear whether these commercial 
banks are developing a genuine interest in lending to agriculture, however, or are simply 
responding to strong incentives from the government (Peoples et al., 1997). 
Most of the attention has focused on the state-owned commercial banks, because 
they dominate the Romanian banking sector. Additionally, nearly all of the other 
Romanian commercial banks are relatively small, and do not want to assume the risks 
associated with lending to agriculture. Typically these banks are engaging in collateral-
based lending, and recognize the hazards involved without a thorough analysis of the 
business being financed. Most loan officers in these institutions, however, are unfamiliar 
with lending techniques necessary to administer and monitor various types of agricultural 
loans. 
In summary it is generally argued that the NBR should not be in the business of 
providing finance to agriculture. The entire system of support for agriculture, in 
particular the means of providing rural finance and credit, needs to be reviewed, so that 
non-inflationary solutions may be found. Central to this will be an improvement in the 
general macro economic environment, the independence of the NBR, the privatization of 
BA, and the liberalization of financial market in Romania (Tesliuc, 1996; Davis, 1997). 
Section II: Credit Flows to the Agricultural Sector and Supply Constraints 
The degree to which farms in Romania are able to ameliorate existing production 
practices, restructure, or accumulate additional and higher quality assets, is largely a 
function of financial access. For purposes of this paper, financial access is defined to be 
the availability and accessibility of funds originating from (1) own resources, (2) informal 
sources, and (3) formal institutions, such as banks or non-bank financial intermediaries 
(NBFis). Because most Romanian farmers identify themselves as liquidity constrained, 
accessibility to outside resources may be important if new investments in agriculture are 
to occur. 
Private farmers have different investment patterns compared to either family or 
formal associations. The destination of investments tends to be for livestock and stables, 
while associations' investments are more focused on equipment and technology (World 
Bank, 1997). These difference in investment strategies begs the question of whether they 
occur because of (1) limited access to finance for private farmers, or (2) because relative 
returns to agricultural investment are significantly lower for the small private farm sector. 
The former issue is addressed in this section, while the latter is investigated in the 
following section. 
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The purpose of this section is to describe the manner, frequency, and terms under 
which loan transactions occur in the private agricultural sector. These terms and 
conditions, characteristic of credit contracts in Romania, are directly translated into 
supply-side obstacles to credit delivery. 
The first survey, conducted in November and March of 1997, covered a sample of 
220 private farms in nine villages. Areas chosen for the study were Dolj, Brasov, and 
Timis. Micro-economic data were collected which concentrated on financial 
intermediation: debt, credit, and savings balance and variability. The second survey, a 
variation of the first, was implemented in winter of 1998. 120 small private farms were 
interviewed in the Doma Basin, located in the mountain region of Romania. Information 
was gathered on small farm production, land tenure arrangements, and financial 
transactions in both the formal and informal sector.6 
Responses from Surveys I and II indicate that the incidence of credit flows to the 
private farm sector are somewhat limited in their outreach. Only 15 percent and 12 
percent (respectively) ofrespondents reported applying for a loan from a formal or semi-
formal institution. Of those households which did apply, 80 percent of applicants (in 
both surveys) were granted a loan from the financial institutions. These numbers indicate 
that barriers to participation in the credit market likely occur ex ante to the application 
process. 
Rationale for non-application falls under two principal categories: (1) own 
resources available, and (2) the existence of unfavorable lending terms and conditions 
(e.g. collateral requirements, interest rates, and loan terms). Since the majority of farm 
households identify themselves as liquidity constrained, most responses to this question 
fell into the latter category.7 Overwhelmingly, farmers in both surveys identified the 
principal impediment to borrowing as the perceived8 high interest rate ( 42 percent and 48 
percent respectively). Surprisingly, relatively few respondents cited excess collateral 
requirements as a significant deterrent to borrowing (3 .5 percent and 0 percent of 
respondents, respectively). Some of the households are simply risk averse, and do not 
want to incur debt under present circumstances (12.5 percent and 7 percent respectively). 
The wide perception of interest rates as being culpable in discouraging 
investments in agriculture disguises, in a large part, other variables which also influence 
the investment decision-making process. Underlying the risk involved with assuming a 
debt with high and volatile nominal interest rates, is the short-term nature of the loan 
contract and/or the high collateral requirements. The first represents an incongruity 
between returns to capital, which may be long term, and loan repayment, which is usually 
short-term. The second presents more of an implicit risk to a household. Because of 
6 Additional information regarding the surveys and the participating regions is found in the appendix of this 
paper. 
7 In Survey I, 20% of households identified the availability of private capital as the principal reason why 
they have not applied for a loan in the previous year, while this number was significantly lower for Survey 
II, with only 8% of farmers classified as non-credit constrained. 
8 In Romania, nominal interest rates have been quite high, but real rates have been moderate, usually 
ranging between 8-10%. 
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restriction on the type of collateral which is accepted9, households stand to lose much 
more than the value of the loan in cases of default. Thus, the three principal supply-side 
barriers which exists can be summarized as the following: 
(1) High and volatile interest rates 
(2) Large collateral requirements 
(3) Short term nature of the loan contract 
Interest Rates: Nominal interest rates in Romania are high, currently running 
approximately 50 percent per annum. Equally threatening to the borrower, however, 
is the extreme volatility and unpredictability which may characterize them. These 
rates have been known to increase dramatically in a short time span. In January of 
1997, for example, they rose from 60 percent to over 100 percent in the course of one 
month. 
High interest rates and high inflation during the past year have thus made borrowing and 
lending a tricky operation not only for farms, which must ensure that their sales prices 
keep up with the inflation of inputs and production costs to cover high interest rates, 
but also for banks, which have to make certain that interest rates are floating during 
the high inflation period to ensure a positive net margin above the real interest rate. 
Fundamentally, the problem becomes one of generating sufficient returns on investments 
to cover interest costs. Because there is not necessarily parity between price 
fluctuations in the financial and agricultural market, however, it is sometimes difficult 
to distinguish those projects which have insufficient marginal rates of return, from 
those which suffer from some form of price stickiness in the output market10• 
Collateral: Banks are engaging in collateral-based lending to the agricultural 
sector, rather than on the underlying profitability and cash flow of the individual 
enterprises being financed (Peoples et al., 1997). In a well functioning economy, 
collateral has two principal roles: (1) insures the lenders' loan portfolio in case of 
default, and (2) acts as a signal of the borrowers' willingness and capacity to repay. The 
institutional difficulties, particularly the legal infrastructure, have incapacitated the ability 
of collateral to fulfill these two roles, however. Contracts are often perceived as being 
neither credible, nor enforceable. High collateral requirements are thus a reflection of the 
pervasive risk in the economic environment, and the high cost associated with enforcing 
repayment in cases of default. 
The situation is further complicated when the type of collateral which is accepted 
is taken into account. Banks, understandably, have a preference for assets which are most 
easily valued and liquidated. Thus, the most common possession which is accepted is a 
house or land with a mortgage. Most banks are unwilling to accept agricultural land, 
9 The most common form of collateral accepted/required by the banking sector is the borrower's house and 
immediate surrounding property. Both the market and intrinsic values of this asset usually are far greater 
than the value of the loan. 
10 A perfect example of this is in the dairy market, where prices are adjusted every 5-6 months, while 
inflation is currently running approximately 3-4 % per month. 
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certain types of machinery, animals, or other physical assets that farm households 
typically possess 11 • 
Loan terms: Persuasive arguments have been made regarding the necessity of 
production and working capital, in the form of small loans, for the private farm sector. 
Capital investments, such as buildings and machinery may require larger loans. In both 
cases, the credit supply, particularly the supply of small loans, is limited due to the high 
fixed costs at the level of the financial intermediary (ACE-Phare, 1997). Many financial 
intermediaries define a minimum loan value below which they become reluctant to 
engage in a contract. Thus, small holders, even if efficient by today's standards, will be 
subject to substantial future competition from the larger, more efficient producers. 
Moreover, the current volatility of the agricultural sector and the unstable macro-
economic conditions have limited commercial bank lending to short term loans of one 
year or less. Thus many borrowers are faced with a divergence between the length of 
return on investments, and debt servicing requirements. 
There is potential to circumvent some of these supply-side obstacles by exploiting 
financial intermediaries other than banks. Romania has a long history of rural credit 
cooperatives (CCs) and organized self-help groups (CAR's), which provide savings 
facilities and loans to agricultural producers and rural businesses (Peoples et al., 1997). 
There are currently over 800 credit cooperatives and 500 CARs providing these services 
in rural areas. CCs generally provide loans with lower and fixed rates of interest, as well 
as less stringent collateral requirements than banks12• Unfortunately, these organizations 
are somewhat limited in the provision of loans in both breadth and depth of outreach. 
Not more than 10 percent of their loan portfolio is generally devoted to the agricultural 
sector. Furthermore, loan sizes are somewhat limited, with a median of about $300 U.S., 
while repayment terms are usually limited to between 6 and 8 months. 
The provision of donor credit is currently being explored in several areas of 
Romania13• Credit in this sense does not imply the extension of grants or highly 
subsidized loans, but refers to NGO's and/or associations which are offering small loans 
at competitive rates of interest. One such association, the Doma Mountain Farmer's 
Association (FAMD), has been engaged in such lending practices since 1995, and has 
enjoyed considerable success. Both small ($300 U.S.) and medium ($5,000 U.S.) size 
loans are granted, with repayment rates in excess of 98 percent. Collateral substitutes, 
such as the reliance on moral pressure and extensive ex ante financial evaluation, are 
accredited with the high repayment rate. Unfortunately, the allocation of these funds is 
still quite expensive, and the continued viability of these organizations is a function of 
donor support. Transforming them into independent and sustainable entities will 
represent a challenge for the next several years. 
11 The appendix contains a table which lays out collateral accepted according to bank. 
12 The interest rate for the Credit Cooperative in the Doma Basin, for example, was fixed at 48% for the 
year 1997, which was approximately 8% lower than offered by Banca Agricola. 
13 The Soros foundation has recently begun pilot projects in Iasi and Bistrita, while World Vision and Aid 
to Artisans are operating small projects in Cluj and lasi. The FAMD is located in Vatra Domei, and is 
funded by German Technical Assistance {GTZ). 
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The existence of the obstacles described above clearly depicts some of the 
limiting factors in the provision of financial services to the private farm sector. An 
examination of credit providers to the farm sector, as indicated by the survey respondents, 
underscores these impediments. In survey I, the key credit provider to small farms is the 
local Credit Cooperative (38 percent of loans reported), followed by Banca Agricola (22 
percent of total loans), and Banca Commercial (18 percent of total loans reported). 
The results of survey II are a slightly more dramatic, with 70 percent of loans 
reported originating from F AMD, followed by a distant 15 percent from Credit Coop. 
No households reported a loan from Banca Agricola. It should be noted that the key 
features of loan contracts from both CC and F AMD, are the less stringent collateral 
requirements, and interest rates which are usually between 5-8 percent lower than those 
offered by commercial banks. Thus, it is not surprising that these two institutions 
dominate the supply of credit in rural areas. 
While the informal financial market in Romania does exist, it is generally quite 
different from those seen in more traditional LDC economies. Money-lenders and trader-
lenders are virtually non-existent. Furthermore, there is strong social pressure to make 
loans at zero interest rates, obviously a deterrent to lending in a highly inflationary 
economy. Nonetheless, informal loans often act as a social buffer, providing quick 
liquidity in times of emergencies, social events, or for small scale investments. 
That the informal financial sector plays a key role in providing short-term loans 
with flexible terms and conditions is demonstrated by the fact that no less than 30 
percent of respondents in the survey reported the use of some form of informal lending14• 
The majority ofloans originated from other farmers in the region (58 percent), usually 
friends or relatives15• Ninety-nine percent of informal loans were offered at a zero 
interest rate, and none were subject to any form of collateral requirement. 
Section III: A Closer Look at the Demand Side 
It is clear that significant obstacles to the delivery of credit to the private farm 
sector exist in Romania. Many of these obstacles are a direct result of distortions in the 
financial sector, coupled with a poor enabling environment. Macroeconomic instability 
and an inadequate legal environment may be identified as serious disincentives to lending 
and borrowing in the current circumstances. 
The low incidences of credit transactions can not be solely attributed to supply-
side deficiencies of the financial market, however. A close examination at the farm level 
reveals that many impediments to farm investment occur less at the financial systems 
level, and more at the production level. Specifically, lack of economic activities, low 
farm and off-farm incomes, and limited investment opportunities may present more 
significant deterrents to farm investment than any of the supply-side barriers discussed in 
the previous section. Agricultural price and policy risk also reinforce reluctance to 
invest within the private farm sector. 
14 These are reported results for survey II only. 
15 The average size of informal loans is $250 U.S., while the maximum reported was $2,000 U.S. Loan 
terms ranged from two months to two years, with a mean of four months. 
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Accordingly, we focus on these demand-side obstacles in this section. An 
investigation of farm structures, management and production practices, and incomes and 
investment opportunities, reveals farm households which can be characterized as 
subsistence farms, with a limited degree of market orientation. The majority of these 
farms are operating on the margin. Supportive data comes from Survey II, focusing 
exclusively on farms in the mountain regions. Although the data and problems described 
below are unique to this region, many of the conclusions and insights can be generalized 
to the larger population of Romanian farms. 
The economic activities in the mountain region are highly diverse, principally 
comprising milk deliveries, animal sales, and forestry products. These sources are 
usually supplemented by off-farm income in the form of either a salary or pension. 
Farms are also participating in such ventures as agro-tourism, formal and informal 
commercial activities, and the provision of both agricultural and non-agricultural 
services. The majority of these farms are involved in at least three or more activities. 
For instance, more than 90 percent of farm households are engaged in milk sales, 70 
percent receive a pension, 57 percent have a fixed salary, and one-third are involved in 
forest activities16• 
The farm structure in the region is characterized by small, fragmented plots. 
Average farm size in Romania usually ranges between two and six hectares, and fields are 
usually divided into several parcels. More than one-half of the sample currently operates 
farms divided into three or more separate tracts, which are located more than three km 
from the house, on average. The small farm size inhibits expansion of existing resources 
in the form of additional livestock capacity and their corresponding input needs. 
Furthermore, the severe farm fragmentation leads to high transport costs and exacerbates 
problems associated with the inadequate infrastructure in the area. 
This paper argues that the farm structure and nature of economic activities 
described above, coupled with external price policy, is ultimately the driving force behind 
limited farm investment, and corresponding credit transactions. Clearly, the level of farm 
income and types of income-generating activities play a key role in the determination of 
credit demand. Demand for credit is a function of ( 1) ability to repay (income level) at 
current loan terms and conditions, and (2) investment opportunities (feasible income-
generating activities). 
Ability to Repay: This section closely examines a farm household's capacity to 
repay. Capacity, in this context is defined as the magnitude and consistency with which a 
potential borrower can repay a loan or debt. The repayment capacity of a household is a 
function of the following: 
(1) Net revenue of household/firm 
(1) Seasonality of Income 
(2) Risk 
16 A complete breakdown of farm activities, and relative proportion of participation can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Net Revenue: The net revenue of a household is perhaps the most important in 
terms of debt-carrying capacity. The majority of farms in the sample, however, identified 
themselves as highly liquidity constrained17, in spite of multiple income sources. Two-
thirds of the farms in the study are considered as either deficit or break-even households. 
The farms identified above have limited debt carrying capacity. Farms with low 
profit margins are either limited to small loan sizes, which may be inadequate for 
investment needs and opportunities, or, if they borrow, are forced to assume high risk 
projects with corresponding high returns. When asked to identify monthly loan 
repayment capacity, two-thirds of households reported a monthly repayment ability of 
less than $35 U.S. per month. The reported results of potential repayment capacity are 
consistent with net revenue estimates. 
Seasonality of Income: In addition to annual net revenues, the consistency of 
income is a principal factor in the determination of loan reimbursement. Incomes which 
are highly variable may be incongruent with rigid repayment schedules. The situation in 
the mountain region is such that milk prices and quantities produced fluctuate according 
to the season, while income from timber and animal sales occur in lump sums, usually no 
more than two to three times annually. Moreover, the majority of expenses for labor and 
transport are usually incurred during the summer months. 
This income volatility is thus a limiting factor in the decision of whether or not to 
borrow. Farms in the region are clearly cognizant of this mismatch between income and 
repayment streams. Farms identified the principal loan repayment source as off-farm 
income, usually salary or pension. This outcome is not surprising, given that salaries and 
pensions are indexed to inflation, they carry no inherent risk, and do not fluctuate 
seasonally. Unfortunately, relying only on salary or pension for reimbursement 
fundamentally restricts repayment capacity, particularly in a country where the mean 
income is $80 U.S. per month, while pensions are usually between one-half and one-
fourth this sum. 
Risk: Risk is arguably one of the principal driving forces affecting production and 
investment decisions in transition economies. In Romania, the extreme macroeconomic, 
institutional, and political instability have directly been translated into disincentives for 
investment in the current environment. The most prevalent types of risk affecting farm 
investment decisions are: (1) price/inflation risk, (2) policy risk, and (3) production risk. 
The first is perhaps the most insidious in terms of undermining and discouraging 
investment decisions. Agricultural prices in Romania can be summed up with two words: 
stickiness and uncertainty. Many agricultural goods are characterized by lagged 
adjustments which do not match the inflation rate, causing an erosion in real earnings 
over time. Furthermore, price uncertainty is embedded in the limited historical 
experience that private producer's have had with free market pricing. Government 
intervention in the production market has been continued until quite recently, with many 
agricultural prices only liberalized as recently as last summer. Thus, the pace and 
direction of change in real output prices is still relatively uncertain at this point. 
17 A fact that is empirically verified when comparing mean annual total revenues from the sample ($ 2,670 
U.S.) with mean total expenses ($2,600 U.S.). 
13 
• 
Agricultural policies can also have an extremely adverse effect on production and 
investment decisions. With the political instability characteristic of the current 
government, the direction, speed, and magnitude with which policies will change is 
unclear. Furthermore, the rate at which policies, programs, and laws in the country are 
created and dismantled is overwhelming. However, the recent price liberalization of 
agricultural products, lifting of restrictions on land markets, and the continuation of 
subsidies for the purchase of inputs signal a supportive trend for the agricultural sector. 
While further institutional reforms should be forthcoming, it is still uncertain whether 
these changes will have a benign, detrimental, or supportive affect on production. This 
risk is then internalized into the investment decision and risk-bearing capabilities of farm 
households. 
Both the crop and livestock production sectors in Romania are threatened by risk 
of natural disasters, to which is added the lack of an insurance system able to guarantee 
rapid compensation for damage (Davis, 1997). The delay in payment for the indemnities, 
the value of which often do not entirely cover losses, represents a great handicap for 
farmers in the areas frequently affected by drought and floods. Under these 
circumstances, farmers are in a situation of not being able to pay their debts when due, 
and their delay can deepen the debt burden in the following periods. 
Investment Opportunities and Returns: Farm investment strategies usually 
dominate discussions amongst the local agricultural ministry, NGO's, and farmers in the 
region. Although there does not exist a true consensus regarding the appropriate type of 
investment alternatives, nor with their method of financing, some generalization 
nonetheless can be made. 
Land acquisition, either in the form of purchase or rental, is considered to be 
integral if farm restructuring is to occur in the future. Although rental and sales markets 
presently exist in the region, they are as yet highly undeveloped. Due to the 
heterogeneous quality of the land, prices are difficult to generalize. The land market is 
quite thin, and prices reflect neither scarcity nor future returns. Moreover, the rental 
agreements which usually exist between farmers are of an informal nature. These 
contracts are often a source of uncertainty regarding future land availability, and may 
represent a disincentive for long-term farm investment. 
Additionally, the returns to land purchases are difficult to quantify. Whether this 
investment is viable in the short and long run is a function of land quality, price and 
location, a farm's existing resource stock with regard to labor, technology, and 
production units, and farm management practices. 
In addition to land acquisition, new technologies and increased mechanization are 
usually identified as optimal investment alternatives. The prevailing farm technologies 
and limited mechanization greatly inhibit production capacity. Large-scale 
mechanization, usually a subject of discussion in other regions, is inappropriate given 
small holder plots and the mountainous topography. Usually, the costs of such items do 
not merit the price or immediate returns, particularly for small farms. Small scale 
mechanization, however, could greatly reduce labor costs and hours needed during 
harvesting season. The expense of such items is more consistent with prevailing 
incomes, and the returns would be easily realized in the immediate reduction of labor 
costs. 
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Additionally, since raising livestock is the mainstay of farm income in the 
mountains, acquiring additional animals is necessary, assuming price incentives exist. 
The purchase of animals is usually discussed in the context of the replacement of older 
animals, the introduction of a more productive breed, or the expansion into a new form of 
animal production. There are many problems associated with the market for live animals, 
however, originating both from historical and prevailing breeding practices as well as the 
high cost of raising animals into maturity. High yielding animals are difficult to identify, 
and their maintenance is often cost-prohibitive. 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided a comprehensive overview of some of the challenges that 
confront the private farm sector in Romania. It is clear that the sector is under-resourced, 
facing financial, technological, and institutional constraints. The lack of financial 
accessibility receives much attention from policy makers, who correctly point to farmers' 
limited financial access and the existence of institutional obstacles which preclude them 
from actively participating in the credit market. The terms and conditions generally 
offered by financial institutions are often incompatible with investments, repayment 
capacity, and the degree of risk adversity generally characteristic of private farms. These 
institutional obstacles may act as both price and non-price barriers to credit transactions, 
effectively constricting the demand for loans. 
Compelling evidence exists, however, which suggests that low effective demand 
for credit is symptomatic of problems at the farm production level. The fragmented farm 
structure and subsistence production techniques employed by many private farmers 
inhibit farm development. Low farm and off-farm incomes, coupled with limited 
investment opportunities, make the assumption of debt highly unattractive. Agricultural 
price and policy risk further contribute to many households' credit aversion. 
Ignoring some of the demand-side constraints can have potentially damaging 
consequences when formulating financial sector policies. Financial sector reforms are 
neither a substitute, nor a catalyst for agricultural reforms. The provision of supply-led 
finance, from either the GOR, multilateral institutions, or international donors is likely to 
be an ineffective means of inducing reforms in the agricultural sector. The provision of 
credit to inefficient farms, whether private or state-owned, will only serve to prolong the 
painful adjustment process. 
Development of the sector requires resources channeled towards improving 
agricultural policies and institutions, developing profitable investment alternatives, and 
improving physical and technological infrastructure in the country. This, coupled with 
financial reform at the systems level, could alleviate many of the lending barriers that 
were discussed in previous sections. 
Social issues affecting agricultural reforms do need to be addressed. The high 
incidence of poverty in rural areas, the aging demographic structure, and the sector's role 
as a buffer for under and unemployment, are causes for concern. In the absence of 
functioning social safety nets, private farmers may merit some form of welfare transfer. 
Any implementation of payments should be both transparent and direct, however. Using 
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the financial sector as a welfare delivery mechanism will serve only to further distort the 
economy, at great cost to the Romanian taxpayer. 
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Appendix 
List of Acronyms: 
AFC Agriculture and Food Consultants International 
BA Agricultural State Bank (Banca Agricola) 
BRD Romanian Development Bank (Banca Romana Dezvoltare) 
CAR Mutual Help Organization (Casa Ajutor Reciproc) 
CC Credit Cooperative 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
FAMDDorna Mountain Farmers' Association (Federatia Agrcultura de Munte Dorna) 
GOR Government of Romania 
NBFI Non-Bank Financial Intermediary 
NGO Non Governmental Organization 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
About the Surveys: 
Survey I: The target of the empirical research was the private farm sector, with 
emphasis on its relationship to the financial market. For the purpose of the survey, 
private farms were identified based on land title, as well as organizational and land use 
differences. Three private farming systems were identified as follows: 
(1) Farm associations with a legal classification (usually co-operatives that have emerged 
from the former state farms); 
(2) Family farm associations (different families or members of the same extended family 
joined together); 
(3) Private individual farmers (independent, with or without a legal land title). 
The study primarily concentrated on the second and third types of the private 
farming system. The survey aimed to obtain a cross-sectional sample which investigated 
aspects of different regional conditions with economic dynamics covering the last three 
years 1995-1997. A sample of 220 private farms was investigated twice during 1997. 
The sample size was restricted by the amount of funds allocated to the empirical research. 
The sample was divided into three strata based on quantitative and qualitative 
criteria of regional development. The selected regions were Brasov, Dolj, and Timis 
counties. In each county three communes (villages) were selected according to the rural 
population, trade structure, and socioeconomic factors. Dolj is a flat dry area in the 
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southwest of Romania with many family associations with a legal classification. Brasov 
is mountainous and located at the heart of Romania with primarily small private 
individual farmers. Timis is fertile region comprised of private farmers' associations and 
individual farmers. 
Survey II: Survey II was a variation of Survey I, concentrating only on the region 
in the Doma Basin. The region of the study is located in the Suceava judet, in the 
Northeast of Romania. The Doma Basin covers mountain valleys within a radius of 50 
km around the small district town ofVatra Domei. The area is mountainous, and raising 
livestock is the principal agricultural activity. The primary agricultural crop is potatoes, 
which are mainly used for home consumption, and paying rent to absentee landowners. 
Cash income from farming is principally earned through milk deliveries. 
Cross sectional data were collected on farm income, land tenure patterns, and 
financial holdings of the private farm sector. Farms selected for the interviews fell into 
three primary categories: 
(1) Those farms in close proximity to the town ofVatra Domei, 
(2) farms located in the outlying communes around Vatra Domei, and 
(3) those farms further than 10 km from the nearest commune. 
These categories represent farms with high, medium, and low accessibility to an urban 
center. 
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Table 1: Reasons for Non-Application for Loans 
as Reported by Borrowers in Survey I 
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High Interest Rate 42 
Collateral Requirements 3.5 
Insufficient Income 10 
Own Resources 27 
Risk Averse 12.5 
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Table 2: Reasons for Non-Application for Loans 
as Reported by Borrowers in Survey II 
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High Interest Rate 
Volatile Interest Rate 
48 
14 
Collateral Requirements 0 
Loan Term 0 
No Profitable Investment 
Opportunity 13 
Risk A verse 15 
Other 10 
Total 100 
Table 3: Percentage of Loans by Source as Reported by Borrowers in Survey I 
I;.~B§t~~ §g~(JJ$) 5.§ t¥ > 
•••~11-1m~~9ii~~~1wnnol\N's•··••••••••••••••••• ~~QRWP.~ > < .. ··.·· 
Credit Cooperative 38 
Banca Agricola 22 
Banca Commerciala 18 
Bancoop 12 
Total 100 
Table 4: Percentage of Loans by Source as Reported by Borrowers in Survey II 
................................................................................................. 
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FAMD 70 
Credit Coop 15 
Banca Dezvoltare 7.5 
Banca Agricola 0 
Banca Commerciala 0 
CEC 0 
Bankcoop 0 
Other 7.5 
Total 100 
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Table 5: Types of Collateral Accepted/Required by Lending Institutions 
in Survey II 
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Table 6: Loan Sizes (in millions of lei) Granted by Institutions in Survey II 
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BA 
CEC 
BRD 
Bancoop 
cc 
FAMD 
Car 
5 million lei 
2-3 million lei 
3 million lei 
1 million lei 
1 million lei 
<1 million lei 
.025 million lei 
*At the time of the survey, $1 U.S.= 8200 Lei 
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250 million lei 15 million lei 
50 million lei 5 million lei 
35 million lei 10 million lei 
20 million lei 10 million lei 
10 million 3 million lei 
20 million lei 3 million lei 
.5 million lei .25 million lei 
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Table 7 Loan Terms (in months) Extended to Clients by Lending Institutions 
Surveyed 
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BA 
CEC 
BRD 
Banco op 
cc 
FAMD 
Car 
1 month 60 months 60 months 
12 months 
.5 months 
1 month 
3 months 
12 months 
.5 month 
240 months 36 months 
84 months 
24 months 
30 months 
18 months 
36 months 
12 months 
6 months 
12 months 
12 months 8 months 
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